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1. Introduction
In her influential book The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt coined,
by reference to Kant, the phrase “the right to have rights”1 to refer to the funda-
mental right to belong to an organized community. This right is the precondition
for being granted any particular set of individual rights at all, and namely rights
not only to freedom but also to action and opinion. This constitutes an illuminating
approach to the concept of citizenship. First, only the citizen is vested with the
privileged status to be a full member of the polity. Second, the citizen alone can
act autonomously in the political sense of being his own master. Citizenship, thus,
works as a means of both inclusion and exclusion, and only those included are
empowered to shape their polity through the democratic process. By the same
token, citizenship establishes a bond of affiliation between the polity and the
citizens, which fosters social identity. Hence, it is no exaggeration to say that the
concept of citizenship epitomizes the modern political ideal of freedom and
equality under law.
Given that citizenship is of such paramount importance in the national polity,
the introduction of a citizenship of the European Union (EU) within the Treaty on
EU in 1992 raised many hopes. Since the late 1980s, the Union was increasingly
deemed to suffer from a democratic deficit.2 This deficit was often attributed to
the lack of a European demos sharing a common identity.3 EU citizenship was,
therefore, regarded as the perfect means to placate the rampant legitimacy crisis in
the EU. At first, however, the catalogue of Union citizenship rights enshrined in
Articles 17–21 (after the renumbering at Amsterdam) of the Treaty establishing
the European Community was not thought to live up to these expectations. Union
citizenship rights’ positive guarantees were at most a reiteration of existing rights
of free movement under the restrictive conditions of the common market regime.
Grouping those rights under the pompous title of Union citizenship was perceived
by some as little more than a misnomer. Notwithstanding this poor start, things
began to change in the early 2000s, mainly through the intervention of the
European Court of Justice (ECJ). Thanks to the latter’s case-law, both the scope
ratione personae and the scope ratione materiae of Union citizenship rights have
gradually been broadened.
This fleshing-out of Union citizenship raises new difficulties, however. As
long as Union citizenship did nothing to deserve its name, the only citizenship that
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held sway in Europe was national citizenship. Today, the situation has changed.4
Union citizenship has acquired a life of its own, and this emancipation has already
had and will increasingly have an impact on the future of national citizenship
in Europe. While it is true that Union citizenship does not replace national
citizenship—and probably because it cannot replace it—it has actually succeeded
in transforming it. One might even go so far as to say that from now on national
citizenship can only be conceived as a pluralistic form of political membership in
Europe: pluralistic in quantitative terms qua membership of the many layers of
political governance in Europe, but also and most importantly pluralistic in quali-
tative terms qua membership of an inclusive national polity. Thus, the concept of
citizenship we are familiar with must be fundamentally reconsidered.
The aim of the present paper is to contribute to such reconsideration in mainly
two ways. On the one hand, the current regime of citizenship rights in Europe can
be mapped out taking into account recent jurisprudential developments and insti-
tutional change. It will be demonstrated that whereas the concept of citizenship
was unitary and exclusive in the framework of the national state, it has gradually
been rendered pluralistic and permeable in the wake of European integration. On
the other hand, propositions shall be made as how to bias this process of trans-
formation in order to approach the theoretical ideal of citizenship under the
condition of transnational integration. Logically, both views integrate into an
overall picture; jurisprudential developments, and case-law in particular, indicate
the specific frictions and tensions arising from implementing another layer of
citizenship into the existing system. Keeping those problems in sight is a first step
toward improving the novel pattern of citizenship rights as a whole—and this
is what the paper is aiming at. Roughly speaking, the question is how to grant
maximum freedom and equality under law to the members of increasingly trans-
national societies. This idea is best captured by the proposed concept of European
citizenship.5
Before going any further, it is worth noting that the authors’ approach to the
above issues draws on a few methodological pointers. First of all, a full account
of citizenship must be dynamic, not static. What citizenship means, which
aspects it emphasizes, and how it is institutionalized, have always been depen-
dent on time and place.6 This is why the idea has proved adaptable to different
political settings: from the laws of Solon and the Roman republic to the national
state and to the EU. Allowing for change and flexibility is particularly important
when it comes to assessing the current situation and, even more so, to forecast-
ing possible future developments. Second, the rights and duties, which the legal
status of citizenship confers on people, pervade almost all aspects of social life.7
Thus, a thorough investigation needs to take a broad political and sociological
view. From this ensues, third, that citizenship is also a normative idea. The
rights and duties, which citizenship comprises, can be regarded as inherently
normative categories. As a consequence, the political structure and the social
stratification they entail must be considered on grounds of normative political
theory as well.
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Accordingly, the present paper combines approaches from various academic
disciplines, mainly European law and political philosophy. Basically, it draws on
developments in primary and secondary European law.8 From there, institutional
tendencies can be identified, their impact on the polity and society can be ana-
lyzed, and conclusions can be reached for future institutional and legal reform.
The paper starts with an account of what citizenship in theory and practice is and
should be (section 2). It then turns to a discussion of the current legal regime of EU
citizenship and unpacks some of its shortcomings (section 3). Based on this
critical assessment, the impact of EU citizenship on national citizenship and on
the principle of nationality can then be measured (section 4). Finally, the proposed
idea of European citizenship is developed to achieve greater democratic inclusion
in Europe (section 5).
2. Citizenship and Democratic Inclusion
2.1 The Material Scope of Citizenship
This first chapter aims at providing a deeper insight into the crucial functions
and characteristics of the institution of citizenship. In this respect, it should be
conceived as a reference point for novel conceptions of citizenship in the post-
national era. Broadly speaking, the concept of citizenship involves three dimen-
sions, which one can term formal, substantive, and affective.9 The formal
dimension refers to a legal status that is conferred on individuals by the sovereign
power of a political community. By granting this status to certain people but not
to everyone, citizenship is always a principle of inclusion as well as of exclusion.
It constitutes, in legal terms, the group of people who are full members of the
polity—and excludes all others. As a consequence, citizenship is a privileged
status. It establishes a special relationship between individuals and their polity,
which is characterized by rights and duties.
The substantive dimension of citizenship corresponds to the content of the
particular bundle of those rights and duties. Accordingly, this aspect can be further
subclassified. Thomas H. Marshall’s distinction between civil, political, and
social rights still provides a valuable analytical grid,10 although it is now relatively
ancient and stems from a specific cultural and political context. Civil rights protect
the individual sphere of free agency in a comprehensive Lockean sense. Political
rights empower people to elect representatives and to stand as candidates in
elections, but also in some cases direct participatory rights; these rights ensue
from the principle of popular sovereignty. The most contended category of rights
is the third one: social rights. According to Marshall, these should enable, “to live
the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.”11
Without playing off these categories of rights against each other, it is obvious that
the political rights and the right to democratic participation in particular have an
exceptional quality. As Habermas puts it, only political autonomy establishes the
legal status of the citizen in a reflective way.12 Only in that particular respect is
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citizenship an active status; that is, something that comes into existence by way of
participating in the process of law giving. This active meaning is the hallmark of
citizenship stricto sensu. It must be distinguished from a merely passive under-
standing, which simply describes the fact of membership in a polity.13 In addition
to Marshall’s categorization of rights, one should mention that citizenship rights
correspond to and are followed by citizenship duties. In practice, they range from
obeying lawful rules to paying taxes and to defending the country, to name the
most prominent examples.14
The third dimension of citizenship is often referred to as its affective or
identity dimension.15 Since this aspect cannot be captured in terms of rights, the
concept of citizenship transcends the language of legal and political theory. The
key to understanding the identity dimension is the socio-psychological concept of
recognition. Conferring citizenship rights on people means recognizing them as
full members of society. When it comes to the development of a firm and stable
identity—be it individual or collective—such mutual recognition of social status
and the positive consequences this has for interaction are paramount.16 Hence, a
people’s collective identity must be conceived as partly resulting from the insti-
tution of citizenship.17 By the same token, citizenship is not only a legal concept
that applies to existing social groups of quasi-primordial nature in order to convert
them into a political entity. Rather, citizenship is a concept of social stratification
from which the consciousness of belonging together and the differentiation
between the “in-group” and the “out-group”18 largely ensues. The conferral of
citizenship rights can thus have a transformative effect on existing socio-political
structures. Consequently, the present paper rejects the view that European citi-
zenship and democracy are doomed to fail as long as there is no European demos
sharing a collective identity. The so-called “no-demos thesis”19 does not cut any
ice because group formation and solidarity can also be the result of the political
process.20 At any rate, the status of citizenship and the identity of the demos are
functionally linked through a process of mutual reproduction.21
Due to this reciprocity between the legal structure and the identity dimension
of a polity, the dialectics of inclusion and exclusion is not only a matter of legal
regulation but also a matter of social cohesion. In its most fundamental sense, the
idea of citizenship culminates in the right to be a full member of a democratic
political entity, rather than in a particular set of rights.22 Indeed, what makes
citizenship so valuable a status is its functioning as principle of democratic
inclusion.
2.2 The Personal Scope of Citizenship
Given the potential for political empowerment and social inclusion that
comes with citizenship rights, the question of who is entitled to be a citizen and for
what reasons is crucial. The traditional criterion according to which the status of
citizenship is conferred on people is nationality, at least since the emergence of
territorialized sovereign states and their progressive democratization.
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As a result, and for a long time, the quest for citizenship boiled down to the
criterion for “being” or “becoming” a member of a particular nation. In principle,
there are only two viable alternatives; this is the distinction between nationality by
birth and naturalization or, more broadly, between nonconsensual and consensual
means of becoming a national and hence a citizen.23 Two basic principles deter-
mine whether one is a member of a nation by birth: ius sanguinis and ius soli.24
Whether nationality is determined by reference to ius sanguinis depends on
heritage, which is usually closely associated with a particular culture, language, or
ethnicity. On the other hand, ius soli couples nationality to the place of birth. The
latter has an inclusive momentum whereas the former is rather exclusive.25 Nowa-
days, most regimes of acquisition of nationality entail elements from both ius
sanguinis and ius soli.26
The problem with ius sanguinis and ius soli is that they both establish a legal
connection between nationality and citizenship, on the one hand, and circum-
stances of birth on the other. Entitlement to the rights of a citizen is in both cases
equally arbitrary and a matter of luck. Besides such involuntary and nonconsen-
sual means of simply being a national by birth, there is the generalized possibility
of becoming a member of a nation after birth; that is, of receiving nationality by
voluntary acts of application and public decision. The minimal requirement for
such naturalization is usually the legal and permanent residence in a state for
several consecutive years and a certain degree of integration in the host state’s
society.27
One of the aims of this paper will be to assess how the traditional principle of
nationality is and should be applied in the increasingly post-national structure
of the EU. Not surprisingly, the criterion of nationality is deficient in terms of
democratic inclusion to the degree that societies become multi- and transnational.
This problem can be exposed by considering the relations between national
citizens and nonnational residents.
2.3 The Territorial Scope of Citizenship
The chasm between citizens and noncitizens depends not only on the granting
of nationality, but also on the status of noncitizens or “others” vis-à-vis the
privileged group of citizens. This may be measured by asking which rights are
conferred on noncitizens legally residing in a state. In principle, the only rights
that apply to all those residing on a national territory, and hence to nonnationals
and noncitizens as well, are human rights. This bundle of rights usually comprises
of civil rights and a modicum of social security. By contrast, political rights, that
is, citizenship rights stricto sensu, are more restrictive in their personal scope and,
in principle, pertain exclusively to the status of citizenship.
So, the cleavage between citizens and noncitizens becomes particularly prob-
lematic from the perspective of democratic inclusion. According to the normative
ideal of popular sovereignty, the people who are (normatively) affected by laws
should also be the authors of those laws and hence be entitled to participate
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directly or indirectly in the law-making process.28 This is after all what is meant
by the “right of rights” and the argument that human rights protection requires first
and foremost granting a right to membership in the political community deciding
over those rights.29 Obviously, this condition is insufficiently met as long as
political rights pertain to the holding of nationality; all resident nonnationals are
excluded from political participation despite these people being potentially
equally affected by the laws and regulations of their host state. Needless to say,
in circumstances of globalization, increased mobility, and constant migration,
the exclusion of nonnationals from the polity they actually live in is ever harder
to justify.30
In order to bridge the gap between universal human rights and particularistic
citizenship rights, a path to full political membership for nonnational migrants
should be cleared.31 A viable solution might be to grant citizenship rights not only
by reference to nationality but also by reference to long-term residence. This may
ensure that those people are full members of the democratic polity who are, as a
matter of fact, already members of the respective society.32 Later in this work it
will be demonstrated that a shift from nationality to residence as a condition for
enjoying certain rights of citizens can actually be observed in the context of EU
citizenship. Moreover, it will be argued that the denationalization of European
citizenship should be taken further to deterritorialization, so as to ensure greater
democratic inclusion in Europe.
3. European Union Citizenship Today
3.1 The Legal Regime
The legal basis of Union citizenship in European primary law lies since 1992
in Articles 17–22 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. The 2000
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU reiterates those rights in Articles 39–46.
It brings in a few new rights from the bulk of the EC Treaty, splitting other rights
in two and extends the personal scope of most rights except political rights in
order to encompass Third Country Nationals (TCNs) residing in the EU. Most
recently, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE), whose future
remains highly uncertain, guarantees EU citizenship rights through the constitu-
tionalized Charter in Articles II—99–102 TCE and, in a shorter form, in Article
I—10 TCE, without, however, adding anything new to the prior regime.33
According to Article 17(1) EC, “every person holding the nationality of a
Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall
complement and not replace national citizenship.” This provision has two impli-
cations. First, EU citizenship has a derivative nature since holding the nationality
of a Member State is a prerequisite for acquiring it. Second, EU citizenship has a
complementary nature as it is not meant to replace national citizenship. According
to Article 17(2) EC, citizens of the Union enjoy all those rights which are
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guaranteed by the EC Treaty and secondary legislation, and are subject to the
respective duties. Thus, the benefits of Union citizenship are not limited to the
rights conferred by Articles 18–21 EC, which are not exhaustive.34 EU citizenship
is evolutionary and can expand to new rights together with the expansion of the
scope of the EC Treaty. In fact, Article 22 EC makes plain that the concept of
Union citizenship was explicitly designed to be developed further.35
Articles 18–21 EC mainly restate the most topical rights from the Treaty, with
the exception of new political rights protected by Articles 19 and 20 EC. Citizen-
ship rights expressly protected are the right of free movement and residence within
the territory of any Member State (Article 18 EC), the right to vote and stand as
a candidate in municipal elections and in elections to the European Parliament in
the Member State in which the citizen lawfully resides (Article 19 EC), the right
to diplomatic and consular protection by any Member State’s authorities in third
countries (Article 20 EC), and the right to petition to the European Parliament and
to apply to the European Ombudsman (Article 21 EC). In sum, citizenship of the
Union appears to be quite piecemeal; it does not match lists of national citizenship
rights and remains particularly thin in terms of political rights. One may further
regret the obvious absence of explicit duties.36
Not surprisingly, the adoption of Articles 17–22 EC has often been deemed as
an exercise in window-dressing. The cause of concern lies not only in those rights’
content but also in their material and personal scope. If one starts by asking which
rights pertain exclusively to the status of citizenship of the Union and hence
whether they have a material scope of their own, the answer is disappointing.
Union citizenship rights only apply within the material and hence mostly eco-
nomic scope of the Treaty.37 Moreover, these rights are inherently limited by
preexisting restrictions in the Treaty.38 Hence, the early concern about the market-
oriented nature of EU citizenship.39
To make things worse, the personal scope of EU citizenship rights is either
too limited or too broad. To start with, the scope of beneficiaries is inherently
limited because EU citizens’ rights can be exercised and are of specific value only
to those citizens who migrate within the EU or have some kind of transnational
connection—and these are very few.40 But the opposite is also true; other EU
citizenship rights, such as those comprised in Article 21 EC,41 are quasi-universal
in their personal scope, thus progressively diluting the inherently exclusive nature
of the citizenship status.42 The only source of exclusive citizenship rights lies in
the relatively thin democratic rights granted by Article 19 EC43 and the right to
diplomatic and consular protection of Article 20 EC.
3.2 Recent Jurisprudential Developments
Thanks to the ECJ’s active case-law in recent years, Union citizenship has
started to develop and hold some of the promises made in 1992.44 In particular, the
ECJ has constantly developed the social dimension of EU citizenship, thus gradu-
ally turning it into a source of rights of its own.45 This evolution has taken place
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primarily through the combined reading of the Union citizenship right of free
movement and residence (Article 18 EC) and the prohibition of discrimination on
grounds of nationality (Article 12 EC). Through this connection, the case-law
finally expanded EU citizenship by making it the fundamental status from which
citizens may directly derive individual rights, while also providing at the same
time a more universal scope for the protection against discrimination in EC law.
The first group of cases decided in the late 1990s has extended the scope
ratione materiae of EU citizenship in extending its rights to noneconomic agents,
such as students, unemployed people, and family members of workers. The first
decision in this jurisprudential evolution was the ECJ’s judgment in Martinez Sala
in 1998.46 In this case, the ECJ allowed Ms Martinez Sala (a Spanish national,
former worker but currently unemployed, who was lawfully residing in Germany)
access to social benefits in her host Member State even though she was not an
economic migrant. In the Grzelczyk case in 2001, the ECJ confirmed that the
material scope of EU citizenship rights is defined by the very fact of migration and
the exercise of the right to move and reside freely in another Member State,
independently of an economic activity.47 What the ECJ acknowledged then was
the direct effect of Article 18 EC. Since 2002, the ECJ has pursued its work of
extension of the scope ratione materiae of EU citizenship,48 and it is this very
jurisprudential evolution that gave rise to the Directive 2004/38/EC which recog-
nizes EU citizens’ free movement and residence rights in general and codifies the
case-law acquis.49
A second group of decisions points to the progressive extension of the scope
ratione personae of EU citizenship rights.50 This extension started with the Car-
penter and Baumbast cases in 2002, where the ECJ granted EU citizens’ TCN
family members quasi-citizenship rights.51 The ECJ has since then pursued its
work of extension of EU citizenship rights to non-European family members.52
3.3 Open Questions
As a result of this extremely active case-law, EU citizenship is gradually
emancipating and turning into a more inclusive form of social and political
membership, which is in line with universal human rights guarantees.53 Nonethe-
less, different questions are still open and remain a source of concern.54
With respect to the material scope of EU citizenship rights, one may regret,
first of all, that, despite their newly acquired direct effect, these rights still have to
be invoked together with Article 12 EC’s non-discrimination principle; this pre-
vents EU citizenship from becoming the direct source of all rights hoped for in
earlier case-law.55 Second, EU citizenship rights may be restricted by reference to
the justifications accepted in the Treaty (Article 18(1) EC by analogy). Thus, EU
citizenship rights are subject to limitations one may accept in relation to funda-
mental economic freedoms, but not to other social and political rights.56 A final
concern is that of the social leveling-down in Member States, which may occur in
reaction to the increasing number of social benefits attached to EU citizenship and
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this despite the scope of the legitimate restrictions to those rights recognized by
the ECJ in its recent case-law.57
As to EU citizenship rights’ personal scope, one may mention the following
three concerns. First, the transnational element, although it has been partially
watered-down through case-law,58 is still a necessary condition of application of
EU citizenship rights. As a consequence, the problem of reverse discrimination of
EU citizens “at home” (i.e., discrimination of nationals in purely national situa-
tions by comparison to how nationals of other Member States would be treated
in the same country) still persists.59 And this, in turn, belies the jurisprudential
evolution toward a regime of EU citizenship qua fundamental status and basis
of all rights in the EU. Second, derivative EU citizenship is, in conformity with
international law,60 determined by reference to the many rules of conferral and
withdrawal of nationality and hence to the rules of citizenship acquisition of
particular Member States.61 There are, in other words, nowadays twenty-five
modes of acquiring the nationality of a Member State and hence EU citizenship,
which is a source of great inequality and jeopardizes the inclusive nature of EU
citizenship.62 The third area of concern is the exclusion of long-term resident
TCNs from the benefits of EU citizenship. They remain generally deprived of
political rights with the exception of those (mostly) municipal voting or partici-
patory rights recognized directly by national law in a few European countries such
as the United Kingdom or Belgium. Since European Others may as European
citizens take part in municipal and European elections in other Member States, it
is difficult to see why non-European Others legally residing in the EU could not
benefit from the same rights.63 Of course, progress has been made in Europe as
well as on the national level where foreigners are granted more and more rights.64
Nevertheless, these rights are still very limited and do not entail political rights
despite some important changes in recent decisions.65
All the aforementioned shortcomings highlight a similar pattern. With respect
to political rights, people living in the European polity are not treated equally.
Either some of these rights are materially limited or the way of acquiring those
rights leads to undue discriminations. This is a serious cause for concern given the
democratic principle of inclusion of all those affected by a decision alluded to
previously. Section 5 of the present paper explores how one could achieve greater
political equality within the EU.
4. The Fate of National Citizenship
Before exploring those ways, it is necessary to investigate further the rela-
tionship and the tension between EU citizenship and national citizenship in
Europe. Although, and paradoxically, because EU citizenship is meant to be
derivative from and complementary to national citizenship, the granting of its
rights and their enforcement are bound to have an impact on both (national)
nationality and national citizenship.
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4.1 European Union Citizenship and Nationality
A primary dimension of the erosion of national citizenship under the pressure
of Union citizenship lies at a deep level. It pertains to nationality and its progres-
sive weakening qua criterion of national and respectively European citizenship.
Conceptually, one may argue that Union citizenship has led to the decoupling
of citizenship from nationality and, as a result, to the gradual erosion of the link
between the former and the latter. In principle, indeed, and on the Member States’
insistence, Union citizenship does not aim at creating a European nationality of its
own and therefore sever the fundamental link between the two. True, the connec-
tion between nationality and citizenship is not entirely undermined, since one
needs to be a Member State national to become a Union citizen. More importantly,
however, Union citizenship generates rights for nationals of a Member State by
virtue of their residing in another Member State. In so doing, it creates a new
category of European nonnational citizens that weakens the traditional exclusivity
of national citizens’ rights in each Member State.66 Recently, TCNs legally resid-
ing in a Member State have also been vested with certain quasi-citizenship rights
in that Member State. In sum, although EU citizenship remains in principle
derivative and based on a Member State’s nationality, it has triggered a shift from
nationality to residence as a criterion for the acquisition of certain national
citizenship rights.
In the light of the above sketched evolution, the holding of a particular
nationality appears to have become less important in European Member States.
Given that a particular nationality is usually the basis for the prerogatives of
national citizenship, it is fair to assume that the status of national citizenship will
no longer be the exclusive provider of rights it traditionally was.
4.2 European Union Citizenship and National Citizenship
Independently of the impact on nationality and hence independently of the
grounds on which national citizenship is granted in Member States, Union citi-
zenship is exerting direct pressure on the organization and role of national citi-
zenship itself. The erosion of traditional national citizenship under the influence of
EU citizenship may already be observed at two levels at least.
First of all, as regards the granting and withdrawal of national citizenship,
Member States used to be the sole competent authority.Yet in a multilevel political
system, there is more than one authority granting rights to national citizens;67
citizenship rights in Europe are fragmented materially across different functional
layers of political organization over the same territory. Thus, for instance, once
national and respectively EU citizenship rights have been granted according to
national rules pertaining to the acquisition of nationality, the vested rights cannot
be withdrawn on purely national grounds.68 As a consequence, national govern-
ments no longer hold absolute sovereignty over the rights and duties of their
citizens.
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Second, Member States also face challenges with respect to the enforcement
of national citizenship rights. True, the main duty-holders corresponding to Union
citizenship rights remain the Member States, and mostly Member States other
than those of nationality of the Union citizen.69 This affects, however, the role of
national authorities in the enforcement of national citizenship rights, as they have
to grant to nonnationals the rights previously exclusively granted to national
citizens.70 Moreover, citizens of the Union see some of their rights as protected by
European authorities as well, when those are vested with implementation compe-
tences. Last but not least, in an increasing number of cases, national authorities
are vested with additional duties toward their own citizens based on the latter’s EU
citizenship rights. Although this consequence of EU citizenship was long pre-
empted by the lack of prohibition of reverse discrimination in EU law, it is now
occurring although in limited instances where a minimal transnational element
can be established in a prima facie purely national situation.71
Going back to the three dimensions of citizenship alluded to previously, one
may say that although the formal status of citizenship in Europe remains based
on nationality, some of the substantive rights can be enjoyed regardless of any
particular nationality—provided one is European and residing in a Member State.
To the degree that citizens perceive their rights as nationality-independent, they
might raise expectations with respect to what European institutions (as opposed
to national ones) should provide. Accordingly, it is likely that these changes in
substantive terms will, in the long run, also affect the identity dimension of
citizenship. If nationals and nonnationals are, to an increasing degree, treated
equally, people’s loyalty and their feelings of belonging are expected to be less
exclusively directed toward the national state. Instead, this is likely to create “an
immediate bond of affiliation”72 between citizens of Member States and the EU.
Union citizens might direct their allegiance toward the Union because they owe
some of their basic rights as citizens to the EU, and because the EU might be
protecting some of them. Provided that the formation of social identities and the
feeling of belonging to a group can, at least in part, be explained in functional
terms, then the benefits that people obtain from EU institutions may foster a
common European identity.73 More importantly, participation in European and
municipal elections could foster feelings of belonging on both the transnational
and the subnational level in other Member States than that of one’s nationality, and
thus further challenge national identity as the primary political identity.
At any event, the long-run impact of these developments would bear on
solidarity, stratification, and social cohesion, which would all partially shift away
from the traditionally exclusive principles of nationality and national citizenship.
This challenge to national identity, though generally welcome, could also have its
drawbacks. On the one hand, it may cause a weakening of national solidarity,
which, for instance, is still necessary for national social policies to be backed by
a majority. This will require Member States to imagine new ways of actively
consolidating affective bonds with national and nonnational European citizens, so
as to complement European ties in national politics. At the same time, however,
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the EU will have to find ways to live up to the institutional expectations raised
among European citizens, which is not always the case at present due to the
competence allocation system in the EU and the intergovernmental mode of
governance that prevails in certain areas of European politics.74 On the other hand,
one should not underestimate the risk of a revival of nationalism and the backlash
of exclusive nationality.75 Eventually, the outlined evolution will necessarily raise
the question of multiple political allegiances.76
5. Toward European Citizenship
5.1 From European Union Citizenship to European Citizenship
Despite these radical transformations, the apparent weakening of national
citizenship need not be deemed a danger to the rights of citizens themselves. On
the contrary, Union citizenship has strengthened the rights of individuals in
whichever Member State they reside with nationality-independent rights that
apply across Member States’ borders in Europe.
In this respect, EU citizenship remedies some of the shortcomings of modern
citizenship alluded to before and in particular the exclusionary nature of national
citizenships in Europe by opening national polities to one another77 and allowing
Union citizens to have a voice in decisions that affect them across Europe. To
some extent, it even extends those benefits to non-European long-term residents in
European Member States. This is primarily the case of TCNs residing inside the
EU. One may even argue that this should also be the case for those residing
beyond its borders whose interests should be taken into account in European
deliberations when they are normatively affected.78 Indeed, the tensions present in
externalizing democratic rights from the realm of a single polity to a multi-polity
are already at play and have been largely resolved within the EU itself with the
extension of previously national rights to nonnational European Others. A further
externalization and transposition to external relations would, therefore, seem
entirely congenial to the EU project.79
This goal has not been achieved by supplanting national citizenships and
replacing them with an overarching supranational citizenship of the Union,
however. Rather, citizenship remains strongly anchored at the national level in
Europe albeit in a different way. The change is both quantitative and qualitative.
First, citizenship in Europe has become multileveled as European citizens are
members of different polities both horizontally across Europe (other Member
States) and vertically (European transnational, international, and supranational
institutions). Second, national citizenship in and of itself has changed in quality
and has been made more inclusive in its scope and mode of functioning. Union
citizenship adds a European dimension to each national demos and, to a certain
extent, alters national citizenship in reconceiving it in a complementary relation to
other Member States’ citizenships.
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This transformation of national citizenship in the EU is best captured by
reference to the notion of European citizenship. European citizens are not only the
citizens of a national state taken individually, but, when they deliberate on issues
of European interest, they are citizens of each state qua key component of the
broader European polity.80 On this model, different national demoi, either located
separately at national level or together in different fora at a transnational or
supranational level, constitute together a functional European demos. For
instance, national citizens and their representatives should vote on European
issues in national settings as European citizens, with their shared European inter-
ests in mind, thus turning national polities into more or less European ones
depending on the topics addressed. Similarly, in European institutions, national
representatives should deliberate neither as representatives of their national demos
only nor as those of a single European demos, but as representatives of a func-
tional demos of demoi. In a nutshell, the EU is neither a mere (international) Union
of democracies nor a (supranational) Union as democracy.81 It is a Union of
peoples, that is, a true demoi-cracy. In the light of this conception, citizenship in
Europe amounts to more than the sum of its parts.
5.2 A Few Directions for Reform
Despite its conceptually innovative features and constituting an avant-garde
experimentation of post-national democratic mechanisms, European citizenship
remains in many areas little more than a distant dream. It is crucial, however, in
this period of transition and questioning in European integration, to go beyond
empty rhetorics. It might be useful therefore to explore ways in which European
citizenship may be further decoupled from nationality and eventually deterritori-
alized so as to encompass all affected interests whether they belong to residents
or not.
5.2.1 Denationalizing European Citizenship
A source of concern alluded to previously is that EU citizenship still appears
to discriminate unduly between different categories of lawfully resident people.
This becomes particularly obvious in view of the limited political rights of TCNs.
The source of inequality can be located in the two concurrent principles that,
today, serve as additional conditions for the granting of rights of European citi-
zens: on the one hand, the nationality of a Member State, and, on the other hand,
lawful residence within EU territory. As a result, there are basically three catego-
ries of lawful residents in each Member State: European nationals, European
nonnationals, and non-European nonnationals.
The proposal that national and hence EU citizenship should be based on
long-term residence and integration to the host society is the natural conse-
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quence of the now largely completed externalization of national citizenship
rights to European nonnationals. The next step would come naturally indeed and
would be to extend them to non-European nonnationals in each Member State.82
In order to grant full membership of the European polity—including democratic
participation—to all lawful long-term residents in European Member States,
three alternative strategies could be envisaged at this stage.
First of all, European citizenship could be granted at EU level only, on
grounds of residence in any Member State, and no longer at national level on
grounds of nationality. In this scenario, the Union would, in a “top down”
manner, extend European citizenship to all lawful long-term residents in the
European territory. Impinging on the core of national sovereignty, this
supranational approach to political membership would clearly be rejected
by Member States. Apart from this practical obstacle, it would sever the
link between national and Union citizenship which is crucial to the multi-
level European polity whose primary locus of deliberation remains the national
state.
Second, some Union citizenship rights, and especially political ones, but not
the whole status of citizenship as such, could be extended to TCNs residing in the
EU.83 The recent tendency in case-law and legislation actually seems to take this
direction.84 The difficulty with this approach, however, is that it risks diluting the
idea of political membership and the inherent exclusivity of citizenship,85 on the
one hand, and to create second-class citizens, on the other.
A third and preferable alternative might be to encourage Member States to
promote naturalization at national level on grounds of residence and thus to extend
the European political franchise through nationalization.86 This presents the
advantage of bringing exclusive European citizenship closer to universal human
rights guarantees without superimposing a homogeneous socio-legal structure
onto the national one. It follows a “bottom to top” approach, which does not betray
the multi-centered structure of the European polity and the central importance
of national democracy in the European demoi-cracy.87 In addition, naturalization
provides access to political participation on the national level of the host Member
State, hence autonomy within that polity that most affects one’s life. The criterion
for being a European citizen would still be nationality of a Member State—yet
nationality of a different kind. Instead of a historically conditioned nationality
based on accidental birthright principles, the community of nationals would also
consist of those who are active members of the society. In fact, this new nationality
would equate residence.88
In theory, this scenario seems perfectly sound. In practice, however,
Member States might be reluctant to harmonize naturalization conditions on the
basis of residence. One might therefore simply wait until residence gradually
imposes itself as the most inclusive and democratic criterion for national citi-
zenship, as this is starting to be the case in certain Northern European coun-
tries.89 Alternatively, a certain pressure from the EU level might confirm and
accelerate this evolution.
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5.2.2 Deterritorializing European Citizenship
Looking into the not-too-distant future, the question must nevertheless be
posed as to whether citizenship based on residence can truly meet the normative
purpose of full political membership. The process of European integration—and
consequently the concept of European citizenship—can only be properly under-
stood in the light of globalization.90
Two concepts have emerged from the debate on globalization that are essen-
tial to understanding future expectations of post-national citizenship. First, there
is the concept of “glocalization,” which rejects the view that globalization is a
process of universalization causing global homogenization. On the contrary, glo-
balization incorporates and even creates local particularities.91 Second, the term
“deterritorialization” describes changes in the nature of social space that transcend
the paradigm of territoriality. Relations between people are increasingly trans-
territorial or supra-territorial.92 The meaning of deterritorialization is well cap-
tured in Giddens’ formula of “separation of space from place,” by which he means
that social relations are cultivated irrespective of face-to-face interaction.93
Instead, social spaces are structured according to interests and functional require-
ments. So are law-making processes in Europe, as they increasingly take place and
apply beyond and across borders.
Both tendencies illustrate the fact that purely national regulations are loosing
not only in effectiveness, but also in legitimacy. There is increasing discrepancy
between political decision making, the reach of national rules, and the scope of
actual interaction. More precisely, one may mention two deficits. On the one hand,
decisions taken within the bounded polity do affect people living outside these
boundaries without giving them the opportunity to have a say on those issues. On
the other hand, the territorial demos cannot control democratic decisions that have
an impact on its politics but take place outside their polity. Such discrepancy is
inevitable to the extent that the scope of political issues no longer coincides with
the polity’s boundary.94 To make matters worse, purely functional spaces of
interaction cannot be mapped on territory at all; the “geography of problems”95
may thus elude any geography of political territories. Adding transnational or
supranational layers of territorial democracy is obviously not a viable solution.
It further complicates the issue as it gives rise to the problem of many majorities
overlapping on the same territory.96 Instead of being deterritorialized, the
decision-making process becomes overterritorialized.97
In response, one could take advantage of the cross-border98 concept of Euro-
pean citizenship and of the progressive process of denationalization it epitomizes,
in order to take it further to deterritorialization and hence partly make up for the
national state’s loss of functionality and legitimacy. First of all, the sociological
model of globalization best matches a multilevel concept of citizenship, such as
that underlying the emerging European citizenship.99 European citizenship not
only transforms, but also strengthens national citizenship in increasing the demo-
cratic inclusion of the national polity; in including nonnational interests, it also
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reinforces the inclusion of national albeit underrepresented interests.100 Consider-
ing deterritorialization, second, the evolution in citizenship theory and practice is
less advanced. Substituting residence for nationality as a basis for citizenship
rights does justice to increased cross-border mobility; yet it still links rights to a
territory. So, the shift from territoriality to functionality present in social interac-
tion has not yet been matched by a shift in the foundations of citizenship. It should
come more easily in European Member States than elsewhere, however, since the
externalization of national citizenship rights to European nonnationals has already
taken place and experiments of functional mutual internalization of interests in
various Member States may already be observed.101
Deterritorialization remains a matter of concern, however, with respect to
democratic rights of participation, which are the hallmark of citizenship stricto
sensu. The rights of the market citizen—that is, property rights and possibly social
rights—can quite easily be implemented beyond borders. In the case of demo-
cratic rights, the structural interdependence between citizens and authorities is
more demanding. The reflexive character of democracy requires a sort of reci-
procity and continuity that a market regime does not. Rights of political partici-
pation institutionalize a feedback loop between the people as subject and the
people as sovereign. Popular sovereignty is based on the persistent congruence of
these two groups. Whereas the market citizen’s belonging to a group is of little
importance, democratic reciprocity can only be guaranteed through group mem-
bership. This explains why territoriality remains the easiest and clearest criterion
of group membership even in the most inclusive European societies. Substituting
residence for nationality has improved democratic inclusion while also maintain-
ing the clear boundaries of a group. Yet—as a brainchild of methodological
territorialism—residence still suffers from a democratic deficit.
The task ahead is therefore to combine the search for greater political inclu-
siveness with the incorporation of principles of functional rather than merely
territorial inclusion, and hence to develop proposals for the institutionalization of
European demoi-cracy. Some have already been put forward, of course, including
reflexive representation models and the correlative electoral sanctions, but scope
precludes addressing them here.102
6. Conclusion
A critical assessment of the present regime of EU citizenship reveals that it is
not an exclusive status pertaining to a comprehensive catalogue of rights which
only Union citizens would enjoy. Citizenship of the Union is a far cry from a fully
fledged citizenship as we know it from the democratic national state. Yet, a
comparison between EU citizenship and national citizenship would be beside the
point since the benefit of EU citizenship ensues from its dynamic interplay with
existing national citizenships. Hence, the idea of European citizenship, that best
reflects the transformative Europeanization of national citizenship in Europe.
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Due to this evolutionary transformation, the concept of citizenship known
from the modern state is no longer suitable for understanding citizens’ rights in the
EU. Within this novel constellation, several inroads have been made into the
traditional prerogatives of national citizenship. Since the Union grants some rights
across Member State borders on grounds of residence rather than nationality, both
nationality and national citizenship are expected to change functions in Europe.
Given that the national state was for a long time the main guarantor of citizens’
rights, the erosion of national citizenship may legitimately generate fears and
doubts about the new European polity. It would be wrong, however, to conceive of
European citizenship as a single supranational citizenship grouping all national
citizens into one single European demos. Rather, national citizenship remains the
primary democratic membership in the European polity albeit in a transformed
way. European citizenship is pluralistic in nature; this pluralism is not only
quantitative in terms of many horizontal and vertical levels of interaction, but also
qualitative in that each national demos has become inclusive of others. As such,
the EU is more than a union of democracies working at many levels: It is a
demoi-cracy in each and every Member State and at all levels of European
governance.
The transformative effect of European citizenship has only started, however,
and numerous tensions remain between the ideal of democratic inclusion and
the exclusive remnants in European citizenship. Thus, the progressive shift
from nationality to residence qua criterion of European citizenship rights has
entrenched undue discriminations between nationals, European nonnationals, and
non-European nonnationals in each Member State. In order to fight these prob-
lems of political discrimination and social stratification, the proposition was made
to facilitate naturalization at the national level on grounds of lawful long-term
residence and integration in national society. This would have the advantage of not
diluting the multileveled and pluralistic nature of the European polity, while at the
same time granting people full political membership of the society they actually
live in.
A further difficulty remains, nevertheless. In a globalized world, the commu-
nity of law-givers and the ones being affected by those laws can no longer be made
congruent on a merely territorial basis. Social and legal interaction is increasingly
deterritorialized and structured according to functional patterns instead. Thus,
residence qua criterion of political membership, which clings to methodological
territorialism, is partially deficient. In order to remedy this shortcoming, solutions
are awaited to gradually ground European citizenship not only on residence, but
also on functional criteria of normative affectedness. What has become clear,
however, is that the goal of democratic inclusion can only be pursued beyond
territoriality through mechanisms of democratic iteration: Current European citi-
zens themselves should be those to allow for such novel patterns of membership.
Going back to Arendt, belonging to a group is the precondition for freedom and
equality: “We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the
strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights.”103
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